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Abstract. In the tax compliance literature, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the degree
of tax morale in developing countries. As a novelty, this paper focuses thus on Latin America,
analysing tax morale as a dependent variable and searching for factors that systematically
affect tax morale, working with the two data sets Latinobarómetro and World Values Survey.
Our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the size
of shadow economy. Furthermore, people who said they knew/have heard about practised tax
avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than others. Looking at individuals’ perception
of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden, lacking honesty, and corruption
are seen as the main factors. We observed a significantly lower tax morale in South Amer-
ica/Mexico than in the Central American/Caribbean area. Furthermore, trust in the president
and the officials, the belief that other individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude
have a significant positive effect on tax morale.
1. Introduction
Tax morale and tax compliance are important factors for guaranteeing an
adequate provision of public goods. Especially in times when the costs of run-
ning public office have strongly increased, governments search for strategies
to generate revenues. A high degree of tax evasion creates misallocations in
resource use (see Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2001). In developing countries
tax evasion is often widespread (see, e.g., de Soto, 2000). Such a high level
of tax evasion reduces government’s ability to work and thus to provide ad-
equate services. Over the last decades, developing countries as, e.g., in Latin
America have made considerable efforts to implement major reforms in tax
policies and to improve the effectiveness of their tax administrations:
“These efforts frequently took place under unfavourable macroeconomic
circumstances. Tax administrators often had to cope with a barrage of
∗ For advice and suggestions thanks are due to Doris Aebi, Rene´ L. Frey and an an-
onymous referee. Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
© Springer 2005.
134
tax reforms, interspersed with numerous ad hoc changes in tax rates, ex-
emptions, and payment periods introduced largely for revenue reasons”
(Casanegra de Jantscher and Bird, 1992: 1–2).
Empirical evidence is rare in the tax compliance literature. Pyle (1993) points
out in a survey: “The solution should lie in the results of empirical studies.
Alas, the current harvest of such studies is remarkably thin” (p. 73).
However, it is interesting to notice that there is hardly any empirical evid-
ence about the degree of tax morale in developing countries. Thus, the focus
on Latin America in this paper is novel. We analyse tax morale as a depend-
ent variable and search for factors that systematically affect tax morale. It
is important to analyse the determinants that influence tax morale in devel-
oping countries, as the environment is different from developed countries.
On the other hand, if we observe similar tendencies, some effects might be
independent of cultural environments. To get a robust picture we are going
to analyse two different data sets: the World Values Survey (WVS) and the
Latinobarómetro. The WVS covers the years from 1981 to 1997 and the Lat-
inobarómetro the year 1998. In Section 2 we are going to give an overview of
the tax system and tax administration in Latin America. Section 3 starts with
a descriptive analysis evaluating the degree of tax morale in different Latin
American countries and checking if there is a correlation between tax morale,
tax avoidance and the size of shadow economy. In a second step, a cross-
section analysis will be made with multiple regressions pooling developing
countries and differentiating between Middle and South America. The paper
finishes with some concluding remarks.
2. Tax morale, tax evasion, and the state
Taxation in developing countries is a challenging topic and has attracted in-
creasing attention in the last two decades. Many problems observed as, for
example, poor administration performance resulting in a lack of tax revenues,
tax structures where considerations of horizontal and vertical tax equity are
not integrated, governmental and economic instability. The levels of tax rev-
enues in percent of the GDP are much lower than in OECD countries (around
18 percent compared to around 40 in OECD countries, see, e.g., Tanzi and
Zee, 2000: 303).
Most countries traditionally have no self-filling procedure but apply de-
ductions. Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1992) criticise that developing coun-
tries imitate the complex tax structures of developed countries despite their
disadvantage of having lower tax administration capabilities. Tax reforms
in the 80s had the intention to increase the stability in the revenue sys-
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tem. The 90s fiscal crises might have been motivating factors for reforms
(see Das-Gupta and Mookherjee, 1995). Jenkins (1995) points out that the
income tax has performed very badly in Latin America, tending to yield
modest amounts of revenue. Characteristics as, for example, a large agri-
cultural sector, a high degree of shadow economy, small firms, and a small
proportion of wage income according to Tanzi and Zee (2000) make it dif-
ficult for developing countries to rely on modern taxeslike personal income
taxes (see also, Burgess and Stern, 1993). The uneven income distribution
and the political and financial power being concentrated in the top prevents
modern tax reforms introducing personal income or property taxes. Thus, it
is not surprising that radical reforms can hardly be seen in such countries (for
a reform overview see, e.g., Bejakovic´, 2000; Cabezas, 1992; Burgess and
Stern, 1993; Martinez-Vazquez, 2001; McLure and Pardo, 1992; Silvani and
Radano, 1992).
An important aim of a tax reform is in general to find a good way to raise
revenues, promote equity and efficiency, without crowding out tax morale.
2.1. Tax morale and tax evasion
There is a lively discussion on how tax attitudes are related to individuals’
action. Is there a correlation between tax morale and tax evasion? In a gen-
eral context, social psychology literature has intensively focused on this topic
(see, e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Lewis (1982) points out that “it could
be that tax evasion is the only channel through which taxpayers can express
their antipathy (. . . ) we can be confident in our general prediction that if tax
attitudes become worse, tax evasion will increase” (p. 165, 177).
The connection between attitude and behaviour is an interesting question
which can be analysed empirically. Weck (1983) found in an empirical ana-
lysis that there is a negative correlation between tax morale and the size
of shadow economy. Compared to other variables tax morale had the most
significant impact on the size of shadow economy. Torgler (2003) shows in a
multivariate analysis for the United States, using the Taxpayer Opinion Sur-
vey, that tax morale and tax evasion are negatively correlated. Furthermore,
integrating European and Transition countries, Torgler (2001a) observed a
significant negative correlation between tax morale and shadow economy.
The informal sector plays an important role in developing countries.
Employment in the informal sector seems to be a relevant income source
for many people. Tanzi (2000) points out that it is realistic to assume that
informal activities are more important in developing than in developed coun-
tries because it is easier to be underground as the exemption levels for
income and value added taxes are lower, social security taxes higher and
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the obstacles to start activities in the formal economy also higher than in
developed countries.
We are going to analyse whether there is a correlation between the size of
shadow economy, measured as the degree of informal employment in percent
of the total population (average 200/2001, estimated in Schneider, 2002: 6),
and tax morale, which we define as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes .The
general question for assessing the level of tax morale in a society is:
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not at all justifiable and 10 means
totally justifiable, how justifiable do you believe it is to: Manage to avoid
paying all his tax.
The question is developed from the Latinobarómetro, an annual public opin-
ion survey carried out in 17 Latin American countries (data from 1998). It
reports the opinions, attitudes, and behaviours of the around 400 million
inhabitants of the region, covering most of Latin America with the excep-
tion of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. Figure 1 gives
the mean value for all countries based on a scale from 0 to 3, were 3 is
the highest tax morale and 0 the lowest (value 0 integrates the values 4 to
10). The results indicate a strong negative correlation between both variables
(-0.511) significant at the 0.05 level (sign. 2-tailed: 0.043). Countries with a
low tax morale show a clear tendency to have a big size of shadow economy.
However, it should be noticed that in some developing countries lawbreaking
helps survive as transaction costs of behaving honestly are too high. The key
problem is that the government is not able to sufficiently secure the property
rights. On the other hand a combination of interventionism and bureaucracy
is observed. Thus, a situation of “over-government” and “under-government”
arises, as Frey and Eichenberger (1999: 89) point out. The government and
the administration have a strong discretionary power over the allocation of
resources which enhances corruption. Thus, individuals’ tax evasion can be
seen as an “exit” option, a signal through which taxpayers can express their
disagreement. De Soto (1989) and his research team conducted an experi-
ment, setting up a small garment factory in Lima, with the aim to comply
with the bureaucratic procedures and thus behave in accordance with the law.
He reports that 10 times they were asked for a bribe to speed up the process
and twice it was the only possibility to continue the experiment. It took 10
months in total to start the business (see also de Soto, 2000).
2.2. Government and the administration
The way people are treated by the authorities affects their evaluation of these
authorities and thus their willingness to co-operate (see, e.g., Lind and Tyler,
1988; Tyler, Casper and Fisher, 1989; Tyler and McGraw, 1986). Whether
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Figure 1. Correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy
Notes. Arg = Argentina, Bol = Bolivia, Bra = Brazil, Col = Columbia, Cos = Costa
Rica, Chi = Chile, Ecu = Ecuador, El = El Salvador, Gua = Guatemala, Hon = Honduras, Mex
= Mexico, Nic = Nicaragua, Pan = Panama, Par = Paraguay, Per = Peru, Uru = Uruguay, Ven
= Venezuela.
they feel treated fairly or not influences their willingness to pay taxes. An
unfair tax system could enhance the incentives to rationalise cheating. Based
on the equity theory, it can be argued that taxpayers perceive their relationship
with the state not only as a relationship of coercion, but also as one of ex-
change (for an overview see Torgler, 2001b). Taxpayers are more inclined to
comply with the law if the exchange between the paid tax and the performed
government services are found to be equitable. Thus, positive actions by the
state are intended to increase taxpayers’ positive attitudes and commitment
to tax system and tax-payment, and thus to enhance compliant behaviour. If
the taxpayers are concerned about the burden of taxation and the way the
government uses the taxes, this might indicate that the relationship between
input (paid taxes) and output (what comes back from the government) is not in
equilibrium. An individual’s tax compliance might thus be influenced by the
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relation between the benefits received from the government in form of public
goods and the price paid for them. Individuals might feel cheated if taxes are
not spent adequately. Moral costs of evading taxes decrease and tax morale
is crowded out. Table 1 indicates that over 46 percent of the respondents in
Latin America believe a high tax burden to be the reason why people do
not pay taxes: “because taxes are too high” has the highest percentage of all
reasons mentioned. Thus, anti-tax feelings arise if the tax burden is perceived
as too heavy. Especially, self-employed people might sense the tax burden
more distinctly as taxes become more perceptible to them. Furthermore, on
average, 32.4 percent mention that people evade taxes “because taxes are ill
spent” The highest value is measured in Mexico (50.3 percent), followed by
El Salvador (46.4) and Ecuador (45.8), and the lowest values are observed in
Guatemala (20.1), Chile (22.6) and Peru (23.2).
We are going to analyse in the empirical part whether more trust in the
authority tend to increase tax morale and thus taxpayers’ intrinsic motiva-
tion to pay taxes. If the state acts trustworthily, taxpayers might be more
willing to comply with the taxes. On the other hand, perceived unfairness
increases the incentive to act against the tax law as psychological costs are
reduced. The relationship between taxpayers and state can be seen as a re-
lational or psychological contract, which involves strong emotional ties and
loyalties (see Feld and Frey, 2002a). Such a psychological tax contract can
be maintained by positive actions, based on trust. More trust might enhance
citizens’ incentive to commit themselves to obedience. Governments with an
authoritarian political structure are quite typical for developing countries. The
presidents often have a strong political role, and active democratic political
participation is often inexistent. Thus, the government plays an important role
in developing countries, where greater difficulties must be confronted than
in developed countries. Taxes can be seen as a price paid for government’s
positive actions. If the president acts trustworthily, people might be more
inclined to pay their taxes. However, we will not only analyse the trust in the
president, but also whether a higher satisfaction with officials has a positive
effect on tax morale. This allows to check the robustness of the trust variable
expanding it to other state agents. Furthermore, the administration (in our case
the tax administration) plays an essential role in the tax policy, especially in
those countries where formal institutions are less stable and credible. In many
developing countries we observe a low capacity of the tax administration to
monitor taxpayers’ compliance. Tanzi (2000) reports a case in Peru where
corruption in the tax administration was so common that the government
had to close down the existing administration to replace it completely1. In
many countries there was a very high demand for poorly paid jobs in the tax
administration, which indicates that applicants were aware of the possibility
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to get extra incomes. Furthermore, in some countries these jobs can be bought
(see also Tanzi, 2000). There are many opportunities for a tax official to de-
mand bribes. The effective tax burden might therefore be much higher than
the official tax burden, e.g., due to the “special payments” to the tax officials.
Tanzi (2000) offers a set of arguments why corruption is likely to be a major
problem in tax administrations (p. 113):
“1. the laws are difficult to understand and can be interpreted differently
so that taxpayers need assistance in complying with them;
2. the payment of taxes requires frequent contacts between taxpayers and
tax administrators;
3. the wages of the tax administrators are low;
4. acts of corruption on the part of the tax administrators are ignored, not
easily discovered or, when discovered, are penalized only mildly;
5. the administrative procedures (for example, the criteria for the selection
of taxpayers for audits) lack transparency and are not closely monitored
within the tax or customs administrations;
6. tax administrators have discretion over important decisions, such as
those related to the provision of tax incentives, determination of tax liab-
ilities, selection of audits, litigations, and so on; and
7. more broadly, when the controls of the state (the principal) over the
agents charged with carrying out its functions are weak”.
Corruption generally undermines the tax morale of the citizens who become
frustrated. Furthermore, there might be a crowding-out effect of moral-
ity among the tax administrators when there is a great number of corrupt
colleagues. Corruption can be reduced with fair procedures. In the tax com-
pliance literature, most studies include the assumption that tax collectors are
intrinsically motivated (see, e.g., Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo, 1999). Discre-
tionary power over resource allocation can induce corruption. Especially in
developing countries, agents as the political elite, administration staff, and le-
gislators have a discretionary power, because institutions are neither credible
nor working well. Over-regulation on the one hand and a lack of democratic
procedures on the other offer a good ground for illegal activities. Corruption
reduces the efficiency of allocation and produces delays in transactions to
acquire additional payments (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Jain, 2001). In
some countries tax collectors’ wages have been raised to reduce the incentive
for them to engage in corruption. Interestingly, such a strategy can also be
reported from Ancient Egypt, where pharaohs increased the salary of tax
agents (scribes) or trained special agents to check corruption in the revenue
bureaus (see Adams, 1993).
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Hindriks et al. (1999) searched for anecdotal evidence in the literature and
report that in Taiwan 94% of interviewed tax administrators admit having let
themselves be bribed and that in India 76% of all government tax inspectors
took bribes. Similar to these findings our descriptive analyses indicate that
people believe corruption to be a real problem in Latin America. As we can
see in Table 1, on average 44.2 percent of the individuals in Latin America
state that individuals evade taxes because there is corruption. Ecuador, Mex-
ico, and El Salvador have the highest values, Argentina, Chile, and Peru the
lowest.
A further important factor mentioned in Table 1 is the lack of civic con-
science and honesty. Honesty restricts the possibility set of an individual to
act illegally. Taxpayers may be aware that their evasion could damage the
welfare of the community they live in. As a consequence, evasion can pro-
duce psychological costs. People may not be comfortable with dishonesty
(see Spicer, 1986). The findings of Orviska and Hudson (2002) evaluating
the British Social Attitudes Survey 1996 indicate that civic conscience has an
impact on individuals’ perceptions of whether tax evasion is right or wrong .
Furthermore, Torgler (2003) shows with the Taxpayer Opinion Survey that a
higher obedience and respect for the authority leads to a significantly higher
tax morale.
On the other hand, people in Latin America do not believe that the de-
terrence instruments are not good enough, which is measured with “because
those that evade taxes go unpunished”. This reason has been mentioned less
often than the other factors, having with 23.1 percent the lowest average
value of all the reasons (Table 1). Thus, this result indicates that an increase
in detection and punishment should not be the only strategy to increase tax
morale and tax compliance. As Frey (1997: 44) points out: “the spirit of law,
including specific rules, should acknowledge the citizens’ basic good will”.
3. Empirical evaluation
In our analysis we are going to use two data sets: the World Values Sur-
vey and the Latinobarómetro. The World Values Survey (WVS) data covers
10 countries (1995–1997), including countries such as Puerto Rico and the
Dominican Republic, which are not available in the Latinobarómetro data
set. In the WVS the general question for assessing the level of tax morale in
a society is:
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it
can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: (. . . )
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Cheating on tax if you have the chance (% “never justified” – code 1 from
a ten-point scale where 1 = never and 10 = always).
Both data sets help get a relatively robust picture of the degree of tax morale
and the determinants that shape tax morale in Latin America. Certainly, sub-
jective surveys are always prone to significant reporting errors. Thus, the way
tax morale is measured in this study is not free of biases. It can be argued that
a taxpayer who has incurred in some illegal behaviour in the past will tend
to excuse this kind of behaviour declaring a high tax morale. Furthermore,
people might overstate their willingness to pay taxes, as there are no sanc-
tions involved. However, our results have indicated previously that there is a
negative correlation between the degree of tax morale and the size of shadow
economy. A further point might be the delicate nature of tax compliance.
However, the way we define tax morale is less delicate than if we would ask
whether a person has evaded taxes or not. A further advantage is the fact that
both data sets cover a broad variety of questions on different topics, which
reduces framing effects compared to a survey based only on tax compliance
questions. The use of different data sources combined with a huge range of
countries reduces biases that could arise from an momentary mood at the time
of the survey. Certainly, it can be criticised that a tax morale variable deduced
from more than one question would be more reliable and valid. On the other
hand, it might be important to focus on a specific tax compliance question
to constitute a reliable measure of tax morale. Using a single question has
also the advantage that problems associated with the construction of an index
can be reduced, such as complexity, especially regarding the measurement
procedure or a feeble correlation between the items.
The descriptive analysis shows that the average tax morale values in both
data sets are similar. 63.2 percent of the individuals stated that “manage to
avoid paying all his tax” is never justified, with a mean value of 2.19 using
the scale from 0 to 3 (3 = highest tax morale) in the Latinobarómetro. On the
other hand, the WVS reports that 66.8 percent argue that cheating on tax if
you have the chance is never justified, with a mean value of 2.22.
In this subsection we will made a multivariate regression analysis in order
to get deeper insights. First we are going to present some theoretical con-
siderations about key determinants that may influence tax morale and thus
allow to develop hypotheses. After that, weighted ordered probit estimations
are going to be presented, using both data sets (Latinobarómetro and World
Values Survey) pooling the countries, but differentiating between regions.
The descriptive analysis shows that Mexico is a special case, indicating
a very low tax morale in both data sets. Furthermore, Mexico can be classi-
fied as region on its own, building the bridge between the United States and
Central America. Thus, we use a separate dummy variable for Mexico.2 In
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general, a cross-country analysis with attitude survey questions might cause
difficulties. Because of the biases connected with cross-country comparisons,
we restrict our analysis to a relatively homogeneous region as Latin America,
building dummy variables to catch regional differences. We start with the
Latinobarómetro, as this data set with 17 countries offers a broader picture of
Latin America than the World Values Survey. As a dependent variable we use
tax morale (scale from 0 to 3, where 3 measures the highest tax morale).
3.1. Multivariate analysis with the Latinobarómetro
Research commonly treats tax evasion as an important reaction to express
preferences. However, there are other possibilities as, e.g., tax avoidance. Tax
avoidance and tax evasion are often not distinguished in economic studies.
We have the possibility to analyse both components. Whereas the World
Values Survey focuses on evasion, the Latinobarómetro puts into account tax
avoidance. Tax evasion might produce higher moral costs than tax avoidance,
as the latter is more broadly accepted being closer to a legal strategy to escape
from tax payments.
3.1.1. Main variables
3.1.1.1. Avoid paying taxes Compared to the World Values Survey the
Latinobarómetro has the advantage to cover additional tax compliance ques-
tions. We have focussed on the following variable, which we define as TAX
AVOIDANCE:
Could you tell me if recently you have known someone or have heard
someone you know comment about somebody who has: Managed to
avoid paying all his tax (1 = yes, 0 = no).
If individuals notice that many others evade taxes, their willingness to con-
tribute may decrease, crowding out their intrinsic motivation to comply with
taxes. Taxpayers get the feeling that they can as well be opportunistic. The
moral costs to evade taxes decrease. Thus, we would hypothesise that taxpay-
ers who know or have heard about citizens who have managed to avoid taxes
have a lower tax morale than others. Lewis (1982: 144) points out that there
might be a “tax subculture, with its own set of unwritten rules and regula-
tions. Thus I am more likely to evade not only because I have friends who, I
know, have got away with it (so why shouldn’t I?) but also because evasion
is ethically acceptable among my friends (. . . ) Furthermore, ‘no friends of
mine can be criminals’ may come the reply: ‘What’s good enough for fine,
upstanding citizens like Fred Bloggs, John Doe, Donald Campbell, Herman
Schmitt and Hans Anderson is good enough for me”’.
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3.1.1.2. Trust that people obey the law This variable measures the contrary
effect of the previous one. If we believe that most people obey the law and
pay their taxes, moral costs of not being obedient increase.3 The hypothesis
would be that an increase in the level of “trust that other people obey the law”
increases tax morale.
3.1.1.3. Perceived probability of being caught Traditionally, tax compli-
ance literature stresses the relevance of deterrence factors as the probability of
being caught and fine rates. However, complying or not is not only a function
of opportunity, tax rates, and probability of detection, but depends also on
social and moral attitudes, institutions, and procedures. Especially when we
analyse tax morale as a dependent variable, it can be doubted that the per-
ceived probability of being caught has a positive effect on tax morale.4Frey
(1997) points out that a high punishment can be an indicator that the gov-
ernment distrust individuals and that compliance is not honoured, which may
undermine tax morale.
3.1.1.4. Trust in the president We are going to analyse whether trust in the
president has a positive effect on tax morale.5 If taxpayers trust the president,
they are more inclined to be honest. Our hypothesis is therefore that a higher
degree of trust in the president leads to a higher tax morale.
3.1.2. Results
Table 2 presents the results. We have used a weighted ordered probit es-
timation to correct the samples and thus to get a reflection of the national
distribution. The ordered probit models are relevant in such an analysis in-
sofar as they help analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent
variable tax morale. However, as in the ordered probit estimation, the equa-
tion has a nonlinear form, only the sign of the coefficient can be directly
interpreted and not its size. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a
method to find the quantitative effect a variable has on tax morale (see, e.g.,
Frey and Stutzer 2002). Only for the highest value “tax avoidance is never
justified” the marginal effects are presented. We can observe that South Amer-
ica and Mexico have a significantly lower tax morale than Central America.
Being from South America (Mexico6) rather than from Central America re-
duces the probability of stating that tax avoidance is never justified by more
than 10 percentage points (20 percentage points). Knowing about individuals
who avoid taxes has a significantly negative effect on tax morale. Thus, the
first hypothesis cannot be rejected. It reduces the share of individuals arguing
that tax morale is never justifiable by more than 6 percentage points. On the
other hand if people trust that others obey the law, tax morale significantly
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increases by more than 8 percentage points. These results show the relevance
of maintaining a high level of social capital.
In line with our expectations, the hypothesis regarding the variable
TRUST PRESIDENT cannot be rejected either, whereas not surprisingly
PERCEPTION BEING CAUGHT is not significant showing a coefficient
with a negative sign. Looking at the control variables we observe that all
age groups from 30 to 65+ have a significantly higher tax morale than the
reference group 16-29. For example, the proportion of persons of the age 65+
who report the highest tax morale is 12.5 percentage points higher than for
the reference age group. Marginal effects increase with an increase of the
age. Furthermore there is the tendency that married people or people who
live together have a significantly higher tax morale than singles. The share of
people reporting the highest tax morale is higher for self-employed persons,
individuals salaried in a private company, and people in charge of a household
than for people salaried in a public company. Tax administration’s collecting
problems affect the monitoring of self-employed individuals, as it is very
difficult and costly to gather information about them. Thus many enterprises,
especially small ones, remain invisible (Burges and Stern, 1993). Regarding
tax morale such a situation does not mean that those individuals’ morale is
lower. On contrary, they do not feel the tax burden as the government and
the administration have difficulties to capture their existence. This might also
explain the difference between people salaried in a private and in a public
company.
It might be interesting to integrate a proxy for income into the estimations.
The Latinobarómetro has no specific information about the income of the
subjects. Thus, the following proxies are integrated into further equations:
OWN HOUSE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS7and FORTUNE.8 Interest-
ingly, all coefficients are not significant, showing low marginal effects, but
the coefficients for the regional variables remain significant (see Table 3).
3.2. Multivariate analysis with the World Values Survey
In a second step we are going to evaluate World Values Survey (WVS) data.
The data set covers a wider range of questions on attitudes issues and socio-
economic characteristics. We evaluate the wave 1995–1997, which covers the
greatest number of Latin American countries. As before, we build regional
dummy variables. The WVS has the disadvantage that Central America
has not been covered sufficiently. Thus, instead of differentiating between
South and Central America, we build additional dummies for Mexico and
the Dominican Republic (Caribbean area). In line with the Latinobarómetro
findings Table 4 indicates that Mexico has a significantly lower tax morale
than the reference group (other Latin American countries).
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Table 3. Tax morale and status in 1998 (Latinobaro´metro)
Weighted ordered probit Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
effect effect effect
Eq. 5 Eq. 6 Eq. 7
a) Demographic variables included included included
b) Marital status included included included
c) Employment status included included included
d) Regional variable
SOUTH AMERICA –0.297∗∗∗ –0.112 –0.283∗∗∗ –0.107 0-0.321∗∗∗ –0.121
MEXICO –0.626∗∗∗ –0.236 –0.624∗∗∗ –0.236 –0.650∗∗∗ –0.245
e) Fortune and status
OWN HOUSE 0.024 0.009
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STATUS –0.007 –0.003
FORTUNE 0.005 0.002
Number of observations 15371 14987 14567
Prob (LM-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes. Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale. In the reference group are AGE
16–29, MALE, SINGLE, SALARIED IN A PUBLIC COMPANY, CENTRAL AMERICA.
Significance levels: ∗ 0.05 < p < 0.10, ∗∗ 0.01 < p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effect =
highest tax morale score (3).
Instead of trust in the president we use satisfaction with officials. This
allows to check the robustness of the trust variable expanding it to other state
agents. The coefficient is highly significant and the marginal effects show
that an increase in the level of satisfaction by one unit raises the share of
individuals stating that tax morale is never justifiable by 1 percentage point.
We have obtained comparable results regarding the control variables. A
higher age has a positive effect on tax morale. Furthermore, married people
(females) have a higher tax morale than singles (males). The coefficient of
the variable EDUCATION has now a negative sign. However, the significant
effect on tax morale is not robust throughout all equations. We also controlled
for the economic situation of the individuals. The results show the tendency
that the lowest group (reference group) has a higher tax morale than the
groups with a better economic situation. However, only the coefficient for the
variable LOWER MIDDLE CLASS indicates a significant difference to the
variable LOWER CLASS. We also checked if people with a stronger religios-
ity have a higher tax morale.9According to Hirschi and Stark (1969) religion
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might inhibit illegal behaviour because religion is a sanctioning system that
legitimises and reinforces social values. Empirical studies have shown that
states and counties with higher rates of religious memberships have signific-
antly less violent and non-violent crime (see, e.g., Hull and Bold, 1994; and
Lipford, McCormick and Tollison, 1993). Table 4 shows a positive correlation
between tax morale and religiosity.
Political participation is a social innovation for Latin America and pro-
duces beneficial effects. In the last decades we observe a strengthening of
democracy in some Latin American countries, as, e.g., in Chile, Mexico
and Argentina. Democracy offers citizens the possibility to express their
preferences. A more active role helps citizens to better monitor and control
politicians and thus to reduce the asymmetry of information between them
and their agents (government), which reduces the discretionary power. This
might influence citizens’ tax morale.10 Thus we would hypothesise that a
stronger pro democratic attitude has a positive effect on tax morale. We have
built variables that measure individuals’ support for democratic government
(PRO DEMOCRACY 111and PRO DEMOCRACY 212). Table 4 indicates
that pro democratic attitudes have a highly significant positive effect on tax
morale. An increase in the pro democracy scale by one unit in both cases
raises the proportion of persons indicating the highest tax morale by 7.3 (4.5)
percentage points. We also analyse the effect of pride on tax morale. Being
proud of her/his country enhances the identification with the state. This might
be a reason for behaving co-operatively and thus finding it important to pay
the taxes. The expected sign for the variable PRIDE13is therefore positive.
Table 4 indicates that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. We find a positive
correlation between pride and tax morale. An increase in pride by one unit
raises the share of persons arguing that tax morale is never justifiable by 9.2
percentage points.
We also explore the effects of satisfaction variables on tax morale. We start
with the variable FINANCIAL SATISFACTION14, which is more strongly
related to tax payments. If the financial situation in a household is poor, the
tax payments might be seen as a hard restriction in their possibility set, which
might reduce tax honesty. To get a broader view, we include the variables
SATISFACTION15and HAPPINESS16. Table 5 presents the results. All three
variables significantly affect tax morale in a positive way. Interestingly, the
variable HAPPINESS has the highest marginal effects.
4. Conclusions
There are a couple of publications about the informal sector in Latin America,
but hardly any study that has analysed tax morale. Most of the empirical evid-
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ence is centred on the USA, evaluating, e.g., the TCMP program or amnesty
data. Thus, it is difficult to know to which extent findings from the United
States can be transferred to other countries. Furthermore, audit and amnesty
data have a selection bias as only specific individuals participate in an am-
nesty and not all individuals (especially tax evaders) are measured with audit
data. Our data sets have also the advantage that they include a broad variety
of socio-economic data. Working with two data sets (Latinobarómetro and
World Values Survey) allows to get a robust picture of tax morale in Latin
America. These two data sets offer the possibility to do a more refined study
covering more than one year.
Our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax
morale and the size of shadow economy. Looking at individuals’ perceptions
of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden, the lack of honesty,
and corruption are seen as the main factors. A tax system must be fair in the
view of the taxpayers. If a taxpayer feels that she/he is in a sort of unfair con-
tract she/he will probably be less likely to comply. As Smith (1992) argues,
cycles of antagonism between the tax administration and the taxpayer might
begin to break with a positive concession by the administrator. Taxpayers are
more inclined to comply to the law if the exchange between the paid tax and
the performed government services are found to be equitable.
In our multivariate analysis we use entire pooled samples to check the
robustness of the findings. We could observe a significantly lower tax morale
in South America/Mexico than in Central America/Caribbean Area. Espe-
cially Mexico has a very low tax morale. Furthermore, people who said they
knew/have heard about practiced tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax
morale than others. On the other hand, if people believe that others obey the
law, their intrinsic motivation to pay taxes increases. In general, the findings
show that a tax policy should maintain a high level of social capital. If people
believe that others are honest their willingness to pay taxes increases. Oth-
erwise, the government and the tax administration get into hot water, as the
tax morale of individuals who notice that many others evade taxes is reduced.
Evasion is a signal that intrinsic motivation is not approved. Thus, taxpayers
get the feeling that they can as well be opportunistic and the moral costs of
evading taxes decrease.
In general, the results indicate that there are alternative tax policy
strategies to those assuming that people are knaves who must be controlled to
reduce their self-interested behaviour and thus tax evasion. It is not necessary
to develop a constitution designed for knaves. Tax law should consider the
“spirit of trust”, i.e., should include specific rules as self-declaration, which
gives taxpayers more scope of their own and supports trustfulness as a motiv-
ation to pay taxes. Trust in the president and the officials, the belief that other
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individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant pos-
itive effect on tax morale. The governments and the tax administration have
to create confidence in their credibility and their capacity to deliver promised
returns for taxes. The relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities, seen
as a relational or psychological contract, involves strong emotional ties and
loyalties. Such a psychological tax contract can be maintained by positive
actions, based on trust (see Feld and Frey, 2002b). If such rules yield good
results and taxpayers make their decisions to comply with taxation according
to past experiences, social capital associated with paying taxes can be created
or maintained. Such a social capital stock can reduce the costs of running the
government.
Notes
1. In 1991 important reforms were enacted in Peru creating an increase in revenues meas-
ured as a percentage of the GDP. The tax administration (Superintendencia Nacional de
Administracion Tributaria) reduced their workforce implementing higher standards and
increased the salary to be competitive with the private sector (Bejakovic´, 2000).
2. The low tax morale in Mexico corresponds to the low revenue performance (also com-
pared to other developing countries), despite the tax structure is comparable to many
OECD countries. Martinez-Vazquez (2001) tries to explain this so-called paradox. As he
mentions, the modern tax system structure is undermined by factors as i) ad hoc policy
measures, ii) lacking ability of tax administrations to deal with a modern tax system, and
iii) Mexican’s authority policy to keep tax efforts (measured as the ratio of revenues to
GDP) relatively constant, which derives from an agreement between the government and
the private sector.
3. The following question has been asked: “In general, would you say that people always
obey the law, or are there exceptions or particular occasions when people can follow their
consciences even if it means breaking the law” (1 = Always obey the law, 0 = follow their
consciences).
4. The Latinobarómetro has asked the respondents the following question: Would you say
that it is very possible, fairly, a little, or not at all possible that a person in our country
who has committed an illegal act gets caught.
5. Trust in government has been measured as follows: Please tell me how much confidence
you have in the president (1 = not at all, 4 = a lot).
6. It is interesting to notice that Mexico had many tax reforms. However, it seems that too
many reforms can produce instability in the tax system. In Mexico reforms took place
in 1978-80, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990-91, 1993, 1994, 1995-97, and 1998
(Martinez-Vazquez, 2001: 29). Martinez-Vazquez (2001) points out that instability of the
tax system makes tax enforcement more difficult and might lead to a lower tax revenue.
Changes demand too much of the tax administration, create uncertainty and confusion
among taxpayers and increase tax compliance costs. Contrary to other Latin American
countries Mexico has a very modern tax revenue structure based on income taxes as the
most important source of revenue (31 percent of total federal revenues in 1998).
7. Socio-economic status (4 = very good, 1 = very bad).
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8. As a proxy for FORTUNE we take the aggregated sum of the following factors: colour TV,
freezer, computer, washing machine, phone, car, second house, drinking water, sewage
system (value 0 to 9).
9. We have developed a religiosity variable from the following question in the WVS: Inde-
pendently of whether you go to church or not, would you say your are a religious person
(value 3), not a religious person (2), a convinced atheist (1).
10. Empirical evidence from Switzerland presented by Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann
(1996) shows that in cantons with a high degree of direct political control tax evasion is –
ceteris paribus – about SFr 1500 lower as compared to the average of the cantons without
such direct influence. Furthermore, using two different data sets at the individual level
(World Values Survey and International Social Survey Programme) Torgler (2002) finds
that direct democratic rights have a significantly positive effect on tax morale.
11. The question is: "Would you say that having a democratic political system is a very good
(4), fairly good (3), fairly bad (2) or very bad (1) way of governing this country" (scale 1
to 4).
12. "Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government" (4 =
strongly agree, 1 = strongly disagree). How proud are you to be . . . ? (substitute your own
nationality for . . . , 1 = not at all proud, 4 = very proud) How satisfied are you with the
financial situation of your household? (scale 1 = dissatisfied to 10 = satisfied)
13. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (scale 1
= dissatisfied to 10 = satisfied).
14. Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy (4), quite happy (3), not
very happy (2), not at all happy (1).
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